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EVIDENCE-THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE-A LITERAL RIGHT
TO A FACE-TO-FACE MEETING. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
In early August 1985 two thirteen-year-old girls were camping
out in a backyard. Sometime during the night a man entered the tent
wearing a stocking over his face. He awakened the girls and shined a
flashlight in their eyes. Warning them not to look at him, he sexually
molested the two girls. Neither of the girls could describe the at-
tacker. Later that month the police arrested Coy, a neighbor of one of
the girls, and charged him with sexual assault.
Soon after the beginning of Coy's trial, the State moved to allow
the girls to testify behind a screen or via closed-circuit television' in
order to protect them from psychological trauma. The trial court al-
lowed the State to use a screen which the prosecution placed between
Coy and the girls during the girls' testimony. Using certain lighting
adjustments, the screen completely prevented the girls from seeing
Coy but allowed Coy to have a dim view of the witnesses. The screen
did not obscure the view of the girls by the judge and jury.
At trial, Coy argued that use of the screen violated his sixth
amendment right of confrontation.2 While the defendant agreed the
screen might accomplish its purpose of easing the girls' fears, he pro-
tested that it denied his constitutional right to confront the witnesses
against him.3 The trial court rejected Coy's claim and found him
guilty.
The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the conviction4 and rejected
the constitutional argument on the ground that the screen did not
detract from Coy's opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. The
United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, reversed
and remanded, noting that the confrontation clause guarantees the
1. IOWA CODE § 910A.14 (Supp. 1988) provides in part that "[t]he court may require a
party be confined to an adjacent room or behind a screen or mirror that permits the party to
see and hear the child during the child's testimony, but does not allow the child to see or hear
the party."
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2799 (1988). The defendant also argued that the screen
violated his right to due process since it would make him appear guilty, thus destroying the
presumption of innocence. The trial court rejected this argument but instructed the jury to
draw no assumptions from the use of the screen. The Iowa Supreme Court also felt that the
procedure was not prejudicial. State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730, 734 (Iowa 1987). The United
States Supreme Court found it unnecessary to rule upon the question. 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
4. State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1987).
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defendant a right to a literal face-to-face encounter with the witnesses.
Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
The sixth amendment to the Constitution guarantees that, "[iun
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him . . . . " While the concept
of the confrontation clause has ancient roots,6 it has little legislative
history? The sixth amendment included the confrontation clause
with the other rights pertaining to a fair trial, and Congress passed
the clause without debate." This lack of legislative discussion requires
an emphasis on judicial analysis to understand the scope of the right
to confrontation. 9
Taken literally, the clause is satisfied only when the witness is in
court at the time of the trial"° and the defendant has an opportunity to
meet the witness face-to-face." However, cases decided by the
Supreme Court have not focused on this issue but on rights inferred
by the clause' 2 and exceptions to the clause.' 3 While these cases dis-
cuss the right to a physical confrontation, the language often centers
on tangential rights, particularly the right of cross-examination.' 4
Thus, until Coy, a sense of disorder has prevailed regarding the
breadth of the confrontation clause and how literally the courts may
construe it.'I
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
6. See Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. PuB. L.
381 (1959). F. Heller suggests that the confrontation clause has its common law origins in the
abuses which occurred at the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603. The prosecution accused
Raleigh of treason against England by conspiring with Lord Cobhan to make Arabella Stuart
the Queen of England. Cobham confessed under torture and later repudiated the confession in
a letter to Raleigh. At his trial, Raleigh demanded to have Cobham brought before the tribu-
nal, but the prosecution refused. The state subsequently convicted and executed Raleigh. F.
HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 104-06
(1951).
7. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 176 n.8 (1970).
8. Id.
9. Bainor, The Constitutionality of the Use of Two- Way Closed Circuit Television to Take
Testimony of Child Victims of Sex Crimes, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 995 (1985).
10. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1979).
11. Green, 399 U.S. at 175.
12. E.g., Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658 (1987) (the right to confront the witness at
some point other than during the trial); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (the
right to cross-examine).
13. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) (defendant may waive right to confront
witnesses by misconduct); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912) (defendant may waive
right to confront witnesses if he voluntarily keeps witnesses away); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165
U.S. 275 (1897) (dying declarations may be admitted as exception to confrontation clause).
14. See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
15. Examples from cases within different circuits exemplify this confusion. Compare
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In Mattox v. United States16 the United States Supreme Court
defined the right of confrontation as providing a two-fold objective:
the chance to meet face-to-face with the witness and the opportunity
to cross-examine.' 7 The right is, however, not inviolable. The Court
reasoned that although there are good reasons to maintain these safe-
guards for defendants, the general rules of law must sometimes yield
to public policy.'I After weighing the competing interests in Mattox,
the Court held that the testimony of a witness who died after giving
evidence at a prior trial could be used in a subsequent proceeding. 19
In several cases following Mattox the Court addressed other ex-
ceptions to the clause and defined the essential elements as physical
confrontation and the right to cross-examine. Kirby v. United States
20
involved a defendant charged with receiving stolen property. The
Supreme Court held that introduction of the record of those convicted
of theft to prove the property was stolen was unconstitutional because
the petitioner had the right to confront witnesses "upon whom he can
look while being tried, whom he is entitled to cross-examine, and
whose testimony he may impeach in every mode authorized by the
established rules .... 21
In Snyder v. Massachusetts22 the Court again stressed that the
key elements of the confrontation clause are the "privilege to confront
one's accusers and cross-examine them face to face .... ,,23 The Court
noted that the trial court did not abridge the defendant's constitu-
tional rights by preventing him from attending a viewing of the scene
United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979) ("While some recent cases use
other language, none denies that confrontation required a face-to-face meeting in 1791 and
none lessens the force of the sixth amendment.") with Canal Zone v. P. (Pinto), 590 F.2d 1344,
1352 (5th Cir. 1979) ("cross-examination is the essential right secured by the confrontation
clause").
16. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
17. Id. at 242-43.
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent deposi-
tions or ex parte affidavits . . . being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal
examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an op-
portunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the wit-
ness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may
look at him, and judge by his demeanor... whether he is worthy of belief.
Id.
18. Id. at 243.
19. Id. at 244.
20. 174 U.S. 47 (1899).
21. Id. at 55.
22. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
23. Id. at 106.
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of the crime with the jury. Dowdell v. United States24 reinforced this
attitude with the explanation that the right of confrontation is "in-
tended to secure the right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to
face, and to thus sift the testimony produced against him .... 25
During the last three decades a subtle shift occurred in the
Court's language. Although the Court still conceded the privilege of
physical confrontation, the opinions concentrated upon the right to
cross-examine. 26 As noted by the Court, while the right to confront a
witness is expressly defined in the sixth amendment, the right to ques-
tion that witness is the outward material result.27
In Pointer v. Texas 28 the Court pointed out the importance of the
confrontation clause in the right to a fair trial, concentrating on the
significance of the right of cross-examination.29 Particularly, the
Court noted that "[i]t cannot seriously be doubted at this late date
that the right of cross-examination is included in the right of an ac-
cused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses against him."3 The
right to cross-examine is "one of the safeguards essential to a fair
trial."',3
The Court's emphasis on cross-examination is perhaps best
shown in Douglas v. Alabama.3 2 In Douglas, the state charged peti-
tioner with assault with intent to murder. The prosecution called an
accomplice to testify. The accomplice invoked the fifth amendment 33
and refused to answer questions. Under the guise of refreshing recol-
lection, the prosecution read a confession by the accomplice, pausing
now and then to ask if those were his words. The accomplice refused
to answer, leaving Douglas without a chance to cross-examine.34 The
United States Supreme Court held that this tactic denied Douglas'
24. 221 U.S. 325 (1911).
25. Id. at 330.
26. See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
27. Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (1987). "[T]hese cases reflect the Confron-
tation Clause's functional purpose in ensuring a defendant an opportunity for cross-examina-
tion." Id.
28. 380 U.S. 400 (1965). Pointer first extended the confrontation clause to the states.
29. Id. at 404-05.
30. Id. at 404.
31. Id. (quoting Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692 (1931)).
32. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
33. -[N]or shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself .. " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
34. Although the prosecutor's reading of the statement was not entered as evidence, there
is a good possibility that in the jury's mind it was. Since the accomplice had not admitted to
the statement, Douglas could not cross-examine him. Likewise, since the prosecutor was not a
witness, Douglas could not cross-examine him. This may have resulted in a strong inference
against the defendant on the jury's mind with no way for him to counteract it. 380 U.S. at 419.
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right to confrontation. Going beyond that, the Court noted that a
sufficient opportunity to cross-examine may fulfill the clause even
when there is no physical confrontation.35
In California v. Green36 the Court held that the confrontation
clause did not prevent the use of an out-of-court statement when the
declarant was under oath, cross-examined, and available at trial.37 In
Green, the Court concentrated on the intent of the clause and defined
its purposes as three-fold.38 First, the clause insures that the witness
testifies under oath. 39 Second, the clause allows the defendant the op-
portunity to cross-examine, otherwise known as the "greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth."'  Finally, the clause
permits the jurors to assess the demeanor of the witness, thus enabling
them to better weigh the credibility of the testimony.4"
Green reaffirmed the position that the right to a physical confron-
tation is a literal right.42 As the opinion noted, the right to confront
the witness at the time of trial "forms the core of the values furthered
by the Confrontation Clause . . . .- In his concurrence, Justice
Harlan observed that previous decisions by the Court "indiscrimi-
nately equated [the right to] 'confrontation' with 'cross-examina-
tion,' "I and that this casual attitude created confusion regarding the
proper role of confrontation, cross-examination, and the hearsay rule
of common law.45
An outline of basic considerations regarding the admission of
out-of-court statements as exceptions to the confrontation clause ap-
peared in Ohio v. Roberts.46 The United States Supreme Court recog-
nized that the clause stresses a "preference" for physical
confrontation at trial but that this preference could give way to excep-
tions based on public policy.4 7 To determine these exceptions, a tribu-
35. Id. at 418. "Our cases construing the clause hold that a primary interest secured by it
is the right of cross-examination; an adequate opportunity for cross-examination may satisfy
the clause even in the absence of physical confrontation." Id.
36. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
37. Id. at 172.
38. Id. at 158.
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940)).
41. Id.
42. "Our own decisions seem to have recognized at an early date ... this literal right to
confront' the witness at the time of trial ...." Id. at 157.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 172 (Harlan, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 173.
46. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
47. Id. at 63-64.
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nal must weigh the rights of the defendant and the facts of each case
with the prevailing public policy.48 As a general approach, the Court
suggested, based on previous cases, that When a hearsay declarant is
not present, the proponent of the hearsay must show the declarant is
unavailable.4 9 If the statement bears sufficient "indicia of reliability"
the court may admit the statement.50 When a party bases evidence on
a hearsay exception firmly rooted within the traditional law, a court
may assume the "reliability" of the statement.5"
During the last ten years, the Court has heard several cases
which define the clause and its exceptions still further.52 These cases
support the idea of physical confrontation, but the Court has not di-
rectly addressed the issue. Kentucky v. Stincer5 3 is a good example of
the attitudes prevailing in the Court and the difference of opinion re-
garding the clause and its meaning. Stincer involved a defendant con-
victed of committing sodomy with two minor girls. Prior to the
introduction of evidence the court held a hearing to decide whether
the girls were competent to testify. 4 The trial judge precluded
Stincer, but not his attorney, from attending. Defendant's counsel
questioned the girls during the hearing, and the judge declared them
competent.
Stincer objected on the ground that his absence from the hearing
resulted in a violation of his constitutional rights under the confronta-
tion clause. He argued that the competency hearing was a crucial
part of the trial and he therefore had a right to confront the wit-
48. Id. at 64.
49. In order to be declared unavailable, the prosecutorial authorities must have made a
good faith effort to obtain the witness for trial. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
50. 448 U.S. at 65-66.
51. Id. at 66. The Supreme Court suggested "dying declarations" as one firmly rooted
hearsay exception. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965). Another source of these
exceptions is found in FED. R. EVID. 803-04.
52. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (defendant does not have the right to
obtain Children and Youth Services records regarding his daughter's case file in a sexual abuse
case); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (defendant's rights violated by not al-
lowing him to question a witness about an event which the jury could have found furnished the
witness a motive for favoring the prosecution); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (defend-
ant's rights violated by not allowing him to question witness regarding his probation status).
53. 107 S. Ct. 2658 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1234 (1988).
54. A court uses a competency hearing to determine whether specific witnesses, especially
children, are competent to testify. The judge, defendant's counsel, and plaintiff's counsel ques-
tion the witness on subjects unrelated to those at trial in an attempt to resolve whether the
witness understands the difference between the truth and a lie, whether the witness can relate a
story to the jury, etc. Children are often asked questions such as their names, where they go to
school, whether they know what a lie is, and the consequences of lying. Id. at 2664-65.
[Vol. 11:591
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nesses. 55 The United States Supreme Court held that there was no
violation of Stincer's rights.56 The Court noted that the opportunity
for cross-examination is the functional purpose protected by the con-
frontation clause.57 For Stincer, that opportunity occurred during
trial where he could ask the same questions as in the hearing.
5 8
The difference of opinion between the majority in Stincer and the
dissent reflects the ambiguity in the clause and the disagreement over
how literally the courts may interpret it.59 In his dissent, Justice Mar-
shall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens," argues that the
Court's decision leaves the clause as nothing more than a guarantee
for cross-examination at some point in the proceedings,61 thus nar-
rowing the analysis to address only one interest in the clause.62 Jus-
tice Marshall also points out that the Court has never identified the
right of cross-examination as the single concern of the clause and that
the majority ignored the plain language of the text.63
In Coy v. Iowa 64 the Court squarely confronted the question of
whether a defendant has the right to a face-to-face meeting. The
United States Supreme Court noted that it had never doubted that the
confrontation clause guaranteed the defendant a face-to-face meeting
with the witnesses against him.65 Previous cases involved either the
admissibility of out-of-court statements66 or the limits on cross-exami-
nation,67 not because these issues are the essential elements of the
clause, but because they are tangential, thus leaving room for uncer-
tainty as to the extent to which the clause includes these elements.68
55. Id at 2661.
56. Id. at 2667.
57. Id at 2662.
58. The questions asked during the competency hearing were questions which could easily
be asked during trial. Id. at 2664.
59. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
60. 107 S. Ct. at 2668 (Marshall, Brennan, Stevens, J.J., dissenting).
61. "The Court today defines respondent's sixth amendment right to be confronted with
the witnesses against him as guaranteeing nothing more than an opportunity to cross-examine
these witnesses at some point during his trial. The Confrontation Clause protects much more."
Id.
62. "Without explanation, the Court narrows its analysis to address exclusively what is
accurately identified as simply a primary interest the clause was intended to secure: the right
of cross-examination." Id. at 2669.
63. Id.
64. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
65. Id. at 2800.
66. E.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
67. E.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308
(1974).
68. 108 S. Ct. at 2800.
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After establishing the right to a face-to-face meeting, the Court
applied it to the particular fact situation and found that the screen
violated Coy's constitutional rights.69 In holding that the procedure
violated the defendant's right of confrontation, 0 the Court dismissed
the State's contention that the protection of the witnesses outweighed
the rights of the defendant.7 The Court recognized that in previous
cases, rights under the clause had not been absolute, but had given
way to other important claims.72 However, these rights had been im-
plicit rights such as the right to cross-examine as opposed to the "irre-
ducible literal meaning of the clause" 7a-the right to a face-to-face
meeting.
Though there may be exceptions to this "core" of the clause,
such exceptions are permissible only when it is necessary to further an
important public policy. 74 The Iowa legislature attempted to further
such a policy by imposing a presumption of trauma over all victims in
this situation.75 However, the Court pointed out that past cases dic-
tated that even with these "inferred" rights, much less the "literal"
right, there must be more than simply a generalized conclusion to
support an exception when that exception is not "firmly... rooted in
our jurisprudence. ' 76 Therefore, to support an abridgment of rights,
there must be particularized findings in each case that a witness needs
special protection.77
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor agreed that use of the
screen violated Coy's right to confrontation, but stated that nothing in
the opinion automatically abrogates the efforts by state legislatures to
protect child witnesses.78 O'Connor noted that many state statutes
69. Id. at 2802.
70. The Court stated that, "[i]t is difficult to imagine a more obvious or damaging viola-
tion of the defendant's right to a face-to-face encounter." Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2802-03.
74. While the Court argues that there may be exceptions to a physical confrontation, it
refuses to outline what constitutes an exception but, rather, "leave[s] [it] for another day." Id.
at 2803.
75. Id.
76. Id. (quoting Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987)). See also Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980) (discussion on the availability of witnesses with regard to
firmly rooted exceptions).
77. 108 S. Ct. at 2803. The state argued a separate issue mentioned in the case but not
covered above. It contended that any error under the confrontation clause was harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt. The United States Supreme Court resolved that the Iowa Supreme
Court had no reason to address the issue since they had found no constitutional violation. The
Court remanded the argument to the lower court. Id.
78. Id. at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
598 [Vol. 11:591
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require that procedures such as videotaped depositions be performed
in the presence of the defendant, thus perhaps alleviating any conflicts
with the confrontation clause." She argued that even if a state statute
fails the requirements of the confrontation clause, recognized excep-
tions to the clause may still protect the child."a
In agreeing with the decision by the majority in Coy, Justice
O'Connor qualified her position by refusing to hold that the right to a
physical confrontation is absolute. She emphasized that the Court
has only held that there is a "preference" for physical confrontation8 '
and that public policy can outweigh that preference. The protection
of molested children is such a policy, but there should be a finding of
"necessity" in each case rather than an overall legislative decision.82
Dissenting, Justice Blackmun argued that the placing of the
screen between Coy and the witnesses at trial did not frustrate the
purposes of the confrontation clause as outlined by California v.
Green.83 Specifically, the girls testified under oath, were subject to
cross-examination, and the jury could observe the demeanor of the
witnesses in an attempt to determine credibility.84 The dissent quoted
J. Wigmore's assertion that there "never was at common law any rec-
ognized right to an indispensable thing called confrontation as distin-
guished from cross-examination'" s5 and the "right of confrontation is
provided 'not for the idle purpose of. . . being gazed upon by [the
witness]' but rather, to allow for cross-examination. 86
Justice Blackmun pointed out that there is only a "preference"
for physical confrontation 87 which may give way to public policy. In
79. States use several methods to protect child witnesses. These include videotaped depo-
sitions and prior testimony, two-way closed-circuit televisions, one-way closed-circuit televi-
sions, and one-way mirrors. These statutes differ from state to state regarding confrontation
between defendant and witness. Id. See also Amicus Curiae Brief for the American Bar Asso-
ciation, Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (No. 86-6757) (1988).
80. 108 S. Ct. at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2805.
83. 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
84. 108 S. Ct. at 2806 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 2807 (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1974)).
86. Id. Wigmore, as one of the foremost authorities on evidence, is often quoted when
discussing the confrontation clause. However, Wigmore strongly adheres to the position that
the opportunity to cross-examine is the essential purpose of the clause. Thus, authors often
cite him to bolster this theory. "Confrontation is, in its main aspect, merely another term for
the test of Cross-examination." 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1365 (1940). "The question,
then, whether there is a right to be confronted with opposing witnesses is essentially a question
whether there is a right to cross-examine. If there has been a Cross-examination, there has
been a Confrontation." 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1396 (1940).
87. 108 S. Ct. at 2806 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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weighing the interests, he believed that the protection of child wit-
nesses is such a situation. When considering the psychological
grinder that these children go through and the state's interest in pro-
tecting them and reducing child abuse, the extent of the abridgment of
Coy's constitutional rights is minimal.8 8
The decision in Coy v. Iowa is significant in two respects. First, it
established the rule that there is a literal right to a face-to-face con-
frontation between the defendant and the witnesses against him. This
decision is a surprising one considering the Court's past cases.8 9 Pre-
vious decisions were ambiguous regarding the role of cross-examina-
tion and the confrontation clause. The language in these earlier cases
implied that as a practical matter confrontation and cross-examina-
tion were identical and that a defendant's right to cross-examine the
witnesses against him satisfied the clause.90 Coy has disproved this
theory and affirmed that, subject to public policy and particularized
findings that the witness needs protection, a face-to-face meeting is
mandated during trial.
Second, and more tailored to this case, Coy will have an impact
on state attempts at innovative means of protecting child witnesses.
The day after the Supreme Court decided Coy, another case involving
the defendant's right to confrontation during a sexual abuse case
came before the Court. In New Mexico v. Tafoya9 the state accused
the defendant, Tafoya, of sexually abusing several young girls. Pursu-
ant to a state statute,92 the trial court permitted videotaped deposi-
tions by the witnesses in lieu of court appearance. The statute
permitted this procedure provided that the defendant, his attorney,
and the district attorney attend the deposition. 9
During the deposition, the court required that the defendant stay
in a control booth with his lawyer. Tafoya could see the witnesses
88. Id. Justice Blackmun also pointed out that legislative exceptions are common to out-
of-court statements, and he argued that there is no need to impose a difference in this situation.
Id. at 2809.
89. See supra notes 27-63 and accompanying text.
90. See Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658 (1987); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415
(1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). See also 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1365
(1940).
91. 105 N.M. 117, 729 P.2d 1371 (1986).
92. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (1978) provides that:
In any prosecution for criminal sexual ... contact of a minor.., the district court
may, for a good cause shown, order the taking of a videotaped deposition of any
alleged victim under the age of sixteen years. The videotaped deposition shall be
taken before the judge in chambers in the presence of the district attorney, the de-
fendant and his attorneys.
93. 105 N.M. at 119, 729 P.2d at 1373.
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testify, and his attorney was in contact with the witnesses through a
headset and microphone. Tafoya argued that this violated his consti-
tutional right to confrontation. The New Mexico Supreme Court dis-
agreed and held that because the "utility of face-to-face confrontation
as an aid to eliciting the truth was remote," 94 the witnesses were un-
available, and the defendant was provided with a chance to cross-ex-
amine, Tafoya's rights were not violated. 95 The United States
Supreme Court, in a decision with no written opinion, vacated the
judgment and remanded it for further consideration in light of Coy v.
Iowa 96
In the aftermath of Coy there is assurance that defendants in
criminal cases will challenge several of the statutes used by the states
to protect child witnesses. 97 If later Supreme Court cases affirm Jus-
tice O'Connor's position,9" those statutes which require the presence
of the defendant during the various procedures may be constitution-
ally valid.99 However, those statutes which do not require the defend-
ant's presence and do not require a "case-specific finding of
necessity""'° to support an exception to the right of confrontation are
open to challenge.
An issue which the Supreme Court did not fully discuss concerns
the dictum regarding the need for particularized findings. In Tafoya,
the prosecution presented expert testimony that the children would
suffer emotional damage if forced to confront the defendant, and on
this evidence the court consented to the videotaped deposition.' 0 '
94. Id. at 121, 729 P.2d at 1375.
95. Id.
96. 108 S. Ct. 2890 (1988).
97. One example is CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86g (Supp. 1988). This statute provides that
a child of twelve or younger may give testimony by closed-circuit television and have present
only the judge, both attorneys, equipment operators, and any person who contributes to the
welfare of the child. The statute does allow for cross-examination and provides for the defend-
ant to see and hear the testimony, but protects the child from hearing or seeing the defendant.
The procedure may occur upon motion by any party. Another example is ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-4253 (Supp. 1988) which provides for testimony by closed-circuit television or by
pre-recorded videotape upon motion by the prosecution. The statute allows the attorneys to
question the child and permits the defendant to see and hear the witness, but provides that the
child cannot see or hear the defendant.
98. Justice O'Connor stated, "I wish to make clear that nothing in today's decision neces-
sarily dooms such efforts by state legislatures to protect child witnesses. Initially, many such
procedures may raise no substantial Confrontation Clause problem since they involve testi-
mony in the presence of the defendant." 108 S. Ct. at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See
supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
99. Several states require the presence of the defendant in the room during testimony.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 92.54(4) (Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55 (Supp. 1988).
100. 108 S. Ct. at 2805.
101. 105 N.M. at 121, 729 P.2d at 1374-75.
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Under the terms set forth in Coy, it would appear that the court made
an individualized finding that it was necessary to protect the children,
thus creating an exception to the confrontation clause. However, the
Supreme Court has not yet decided if the exception is valid.
Arkansas allows videotaped depositions of child victims under
the age of 17 in sexual offense prosecutions. 102 The effect of Coy on
this procedure will depend on future developments in this area. Over-
all, the statute does appear to provide the guidelines set out by the
Court by mandating that the defendant be present at the deposi-
tion,"0 3 thus fulfilling the right to a face-to-face meeting. The statute
also allows the prosecutor to call the witness to testify in court if nec-
essary to discover the truth.l°4 However, the statute does not provide
the criteria needed to establish particularized findings of necessity to
create an exception to the confrontation clause.
There is a fundamental need to protect child witnesses from the
trauma of facing the accused sexual offender in court. In composing
an adequate statute, a state legislature must consider this policy when
balancing the child's rights against those of the accused. In light of
Coy, however, drafters must understand that the defendant's right to
confront the witness is a basic foundation for the proposed statute.
Therefore, any statute must have that foundation built into it when
considering videotaped depositions or testimony by two-way cameras
or closed-circuit television.
Depending on future developments and how literally the courts
interpret the dictum in Coy, there is an exception to confrontation. In
addressing this exception, statutes should include a detailed proce-
dure by which courts may find it necessary to protect these child wit-
nesses based on expert testimony of physical or emotional problems
which would occur should the child have to confront the accused.
Tammera L. Rankin
102. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-44-203 (1987). Arkansas allows the court to accept videotape
depositions if good cause is shown.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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